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BUDDHISM AND AMERICAN THINKERS. Edited by Kenneth K. 
Inada and Nolan Pliny Jacobson. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1984. pp. xww+180. ISBN 0-87395-753
This attractively bound book carries on its front page a photograph of two 
neighboring islands on a wide sea. The picture forcibly reminded me of a 
scene in a Dr. Dolittle movie I happened to watch on television not so long 
ago. Therein the heroes are saved from a cruel death at the hands of the 
natives of a tropical island by a miraculous happening: the island is joined 
again with a piece of land it had been separated from, and it is a perfect fit, up 
to the last nook and cranny—even a few trees that had been split in half 
become whole again. An apt simile for the meeting of East and West taking 
place at present? Hardly so. Although two of the essays in the book seem to 
suggest exactly this, they themselves make me rather think of two blind per­
sons exploring one another’s faces with their fingertips, and thereby dreaming 
their own dreams ....
The book offers us nine essays written by people—six Westerners and three 
Easterners—of widely divergent backgrounds. Still, as far as collections of 
essays go, it shows a laudable unity of theme and intent. All essays look to 
Buddhism for possibilities of cultural renewal for the West, while several 
stress at the same time the conviviality that exists between much American 
philosophy of recent times and ancient Buddhist insights. In American 
philosophy, pragmatism gets its share of attention, but all in all process 
philosophy looms so large that the Introduction can characterize the book as 
“an effort to use Whiteheadian categories of thought as aides in interpreting 
the Buddhist orientation to life” (p. vm). In Buddhism, Mahayana 
philosophy of the Hua-yen variety is especially singled out. While some of the 
articles are of exceptionally high quality, all are well written and afford in­
teresting reading. They taught this reviewer many things, not the least about 
American philosophical trends.
A quick review of the individual contributions may now be in order. In the 
opening essay, “Toward a Buddhisto-Christian Religion,” Charles Hart­
shorne sketches his own encounter with Buddhism and its stress on in-
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terdependence and process, in the context of his personal dissatisfaction with 
the Western notions of substance and self-identity (self-interest). Hart­
shorne’s position may be so well known by now that little more need be said 
about it here. Suffice it to say that he again emphatically states his opposition 
to the totally symmetrical view of interdependence of the Hua-yen school, 
Japanese Zen, and the Kyoto philosophers, as incompatible with creativity.
David L. Hall, “The Width of Civilized Experience: Comparative 
Philosophy and the Pursuit of Evidence,” expects engagement by a 
philosophical elite with Chinese culture—he focuses indeed on the Chinese 
Taoist-Buddhist heritage—not only to enrich our Western cultural sensorium 
(traditionally dominated by scientific and moral interests) with novel 
evidences (especially of the aesthetic and mystical kinds), but also to awaken 
the moribund philosophical enterprise to new life. In his comparative 
philosophy, he values the early contributions by F. S. C. Northrop and 
Joseph Needleman, but again looks especially to A. N. Whitehead for 
guidance. He faults most process philosophers, however, for reducing 
Whitehead to a neo-classical theologian, with neglect of his mystical view of 
religion. Important may be his call for rigorous comparative methodologies, 
with the recognition that comparative philosophy is still in its infancy and 
“that the development of a comparative methodology is an extended process 
of tentative and pragmatic evidence which only gradually may approach 
philosophic adequacy” (p. 20).
In “A Buddhist Analysis of Human Experience,” Nolan Pliny Jacobson 
looks to Buddhism for a powerful ally in the overcoming of the “cultural 
bind”: The strictures of civilization and culture whereby the individuals are 
forced to “accept their lives, as it were, secondhand,” with neglect of their 
“own original concrete experience.” Buddhism is then described as sharing 
this fundamental concern—“emphasis upon a fulness of experience”—which 
is said to be strongly present in American philosophy. I am sorry to say that I 
cannot but feel that hereby all of Buddhism, in its rich variety and strong 
culture-boundedness, is uniformly painted in the red, white, and blue of the 
stars and stripes. Would Shakyamuni recognize himself in Jacobson’s “need 
to be faithful to the fundamental creativity of life” (p. 47)?
In a lucid piece of writing. Jay McDaniel (“Enlightenment in Process 
Perspective”) aims at a particular Buddhist-Christian synthesis which he calls 
“enlightened eschatology”: a wedlock of the Buddhist Mahayana’s 
“enlightened attunement to the ways things are” with the Judeo-Christian 
“eschatological consideration of how things might be.” There can be no 
doubt that the author points here to an extremely important one-sidedness of, 
and difference between, the two doctrines and that his very intelligent efforts 
to bring the two to a synthesis in wholeness must be highly applauded.
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However, the costs in traditional doctrines of this insertion of a future- 
oriented concern with social realities in Buddhism are not counted here; and 
they might prove exorbitant—something about which Zen, as represented by 
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, might not care, but what about the others? McDaniel's 
analysis of enlightenment in Whiteheadian categories seemed especially 
enlightening.- Still, there remains in me a fear that the introduction of 
Whiteheadian thought as a “new Abhidharma” to explicate Shakyamuni’s in­
tuition might prove equally misleading as the first one.
The next essay is Kenneth K. Inada's “The American Involvement with 
Sunyatft: Prospects.*’ In this remarkable essay, which goes most directly to the 
core of the question formulated in the title of the book, Inada describes 
&lnyata as an idea and discipline opening one to the experiential process in all 
its fulness—in contradistinction with the Anglo-American empiricism with its 
“prosaic attachment to the empirical nature of things*’ (p. 74). If this seems 
to bode poorly for a real encounter of America with $Qnyat& and a true 
American understanding of Buddhism, Inada finds reasons for optimism in 
the seriousness of Buddhist studies of the younger generation of American 
scholars, in the concerns of the “whole American pragmatic movement,’’ and 
most of all in the creative nature of the American pluralistic experience. The 
author’s presentation of sunyata as a notion whose potentialities are still open 
to further exploration, not only by theoretical analysis of its nature, but 
especially by cultural experience, is refreshing indeed.
David Lee Miller offers us “Buddhism and Wieman on Suffering and Joy.** 
I agree I should feel grateful to Miller for his beautiful introduction of an 
American philosopher-theologian of whose existence 1 was not aware until 
now, but I must confess that my feelings of gratitude are by far overshadowed 
by my irritation at the arbitrary way the Buddha has been dragged into the pic­
ture. I honestly do not see how Wieman’s central idea of “creative inter­
change’* with one’s fellow humans or Miller’s “empirical commitment into 
the creative foundations of the world” (p. 110) can be called characteristic of 
the Buddha. And if I must concede that both Shakyamuni and Wieman see an 
intimate connection between joy and suffering, I am willing to do this only 
under loud protest that the structure of the relationship looks to me fundamen­
tally different in both cases.
In “Buddhist Logic and Western Thought,” Richard S. Y. Chi pleads for a 
full recognition of the Buddhist logician DignSga’s theory of the sixteen truth 
functions in Western logic. In view of the central role logic unavoidably plays 
in the East-West encounter, Chi must be making an important point—which, 
however, in its technicality, is hard to judge for the layman, meaning this 
reviewer.
Robert C. Neville’s “Buddhism and Process Philosophy” is probably the
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most deeply probing essay in the book. Buddhism appears (as already in a few 
earlier essays) as “a commanding metaphysical vision of process” (p. 121), 
and Process Philosophy as a Western way of thinking wherein Buddhism can 
find a congenial resonance, not unlike it did in Chinese Taoism. Then, 
however, Neville makes two important points: 1) that a comparison with Pro­
cess Philosophy cannot cover all aspects of Buddhism; and 2) following Hart­
shorne, that Whiteheadian creativity and assymetry in the interrelatedness of 
things are not to be found in Buddhism. After showing how “Nagftrjuna’s 
refutation of causation and change fails with respect to the contributions of 
Process Philosophy” (p. 132), he develops the thesis that Buddhist emptiness 
and interrelatedness do not necessarily imply a rejection of assymetry in causa­
tion in the cosmological dimension, while on the other hand its view of perfect 
symmetry may fit reality in its ontological dimension. This certainly offers am­
ple food for thought.
The collection ends, as it began, with the contribution of an eminent per­
sonality; this time Nakamura Hajime’s ideas on “Interrelations] Existence.” 
The interrelatedness of all beings—a theme that runs through all the essays as 
apparently the main lesson the West must learn from Buddhism—is here 
brought down to the level of concrete human existence. It is indeed the ethos 
that pervades a great part of Japanese Buddhism and may well present a 
powerful antidote against our Western individualism.
I can only hope that this short summary gives some idea of the richness of 
the book’s contents, although it cannot, of course, do justice to it. If, on the 
way I have grumbled a bit, it is only because at some points we are offered all 
too graphic illustrations of comparative philosophy “in its infancy.” Indeed, 
we do not always seem to be beyond the point yet where we “reconstruct” the 
partner (in casu, Buddhism) in our own image, or rather as the counterpoint 
of ourselves. In the present benevolent approach this leads to adorning Bud­
dhism with all the virtues we miss in our own civilization; but in its apologetic 
variety, this same fundamental “Einsteliung" would come down to putting 
the other up as the counterfoil of all the strong points we flatter ourselves to 
possess. The former attitude is, of course, ethically more desirable, but not 
necessarily more true or more helpful in the long run. It is most probably true 
that Buddhism must and will change by its encounter with the West (as in­
dicated on pp. xv and 164, note 4), but the fact remains that, if we want to 
allow the other to be a real factor in our thinking, we must first try to see him 
as he is, now.
The editors and the State University of New York deserve our gratitude for 
making these essays available to us in a beautiful form.
Jan Van Bragt
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